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service contract prices amid costs
itemized as "License, Title and
Taxes."

The plaintiffs objected to
these practices for several reasons.
First, not all the money listed under
"Amount Paid to Others" actually
went to others. The dealership
retained a portion of the proceeds.
Second, the plaintiffs alleged
misrepresentation as to the specific
amount paid to the dealership versus
that rendered to others. Finally, the
information placed under "License,
Title and Taxes" appeared to be
nonnegotiable because of its
location on the form.
The defendants moved to
dismiss the action based on its
compliance with both the TILA and
Regulation Z. The defendant
reasoned that its use of model forms,
provided by the Federal Reserve
Board, precluded any fraud under
the TILA. However, the court found
that if information contained on
these forms was false, the use of the
form would not provide immunity.
Thus, the court held that the

plaintiffs had stated a cause of
action on this claim and denied the
motion to dismiss.
The court did, however,
dismiss the plaintiffs' claim of
misrepresentation of the service
contract price as nonnegotiable.
After examining the form and
regulations, it found no other place
to put the charges on the form; and
that the regulations expressly
authorized the defendant to list the
charges in that category. Therefore,
the court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss this issue.

Illinois Consumer Fraud Act
broader than the TILA
The defendant also
challenged the plaintiffs' claim
under the CFA and alleged three
grounds for dismissal: claiming that
overcharging a consumer was not a
violation of the CFA; defendant's
compliance with TILA precluded a
finding of a violation of CFA; and
the plaintiffs' damage remedy was

too speculative to admit consideration.
The court found the
defendant's first argument inviable
because the plaintiff claimed
deception, not excessive price. This
constituted a cause of action since
the full amount of the money
earmarked for the service contract
went to a third party. Second, the
court determined that despite
defendant's compliance with the
TILA, the CFA may reach beyond
the TILA. Although a creditor's
compliance with Regulation Z
automatically comports agreement
with the TILA, this is not necessarily the case with the CFA. However,
in this case, the plaintiffs' claim
regarding misrepresentation of a
nonnegotiable item did not state a
claim, and therefore was dismissed.
Finally, the defendant argued that
damages claimed by the plaintiffs
were too speculative to warrant
consideration. However, the
defendant did not follow up on this
count and the court thereby dismissed it.

Housing authority is a "person" under state's
Consumer Fraud Act
by Dana Shannon
In Zorba Contractors,Inc. v. HousingAuth. of
Newark, 660 A.2d 550 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1995), the appellate court of New Jersey held that a
housing authority is a "person" as defined by the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("CFA"), section 56:8-1 to
56:8-20 of the New Jersey Revised Statutes.
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Housing authority seeks repair or
replacement of faulty roofing
The Housing Authority of the City of
Newark ("Authority"), a defendant in a multi-party
case, filed a third party action against three roofing
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supply companies. The Authority alleged violations of
the CFA and sought costs for the replacement or repair
of defective roofing materials.
The trial court reasoned that if the legislature
had intended to include organizations in the CFA's
definition of "person," then it would have specifically
listed organizations, such as the Authority, in the statute.
Since the CFA listed neither "organization" nor the
Authority in its definition of "person," the trial court
dismissed the Authority's claims. The Authority appealed.

Expansive statutory language and remedial
purpose reveal legislature's intention
On appeal, the Authority argued that the CFA's
language demonstrates the legislature's intention that the
term "person" should be liberally construed. In addition,
the Authority asserted that controlling law dictates an
expansive reading of the CFA. The appellate court began
its analysis by examining the language of 56:8-1(d),
which states:
The term "person" as used in this act shall
include any natural person or his legal representative, partnership, corporation, company, trust,
business entity or association, and any agent,
employee, salesman, partner, officer, director,
member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestuis
que trustent thereof ....

Applying principles of statutory construction, the
court observed that "includes" is generally a term of
expansion rather than limitation. Thus, the court noted
that "includes" suggests other items may be includable
even though they are not delineated.
In addition, the court commented that the
Authority shares characteristics with entities, such as
corporations, that are specifically listed in the CFA's
definition of "person." For example, the court explained
that the Authority can make and execute contracts,
borrow money, and acquire real or personal property,
much as a "corporation," "company," "business entity,"
or "association" does.
Furthermore, the court examined the objective
of the CFA, which is "to discourage unlawful sales and
advertising practices designed to induce consumers to
purchase merchandise." Emphasizing the CFA's goal of
consumer protection, the court again turned to statutory
interpretation. The court recognized that "consumer" is
typically defined as "one who uses (economic) goods,
and so diminishes or destroys their utilities." Applying
this definition, the court found that the Authority is
undoubtedly a consumer, since it purchases goods with
public funds to benefit certain segments of the populace.
The court also concluded that the CFA, as remedial
legislation, requires an expansive construction in favor
of consumer protection. Accordingly, the court held that
the term "person," as defined by the CFA, includes a
public authority acting as a consumer; therefore, a public
authority may prosecute a consumer fraud claim.

Salesman's deceptive statements constitute an
unfair trade practice
by Dana Shannon

In Torrance v. AS & L
Motors, Ltd., 459 S.E.2d 67 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1995), the North Carolina
Court of Appeals held that an
automobile salesman's deceptive
comments concerning the condition
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of a used car constituted an unfair
trade practice. In addition, the court
determined that the parol evidence
rule did not bar evidence of the
salesman's misleading statements,
which occurred prior to the

plaintiff's execution of an "as is-no
warranty" agreement. Although the
court affirmed the trial court by
allowing the salesman's statements
as evidence and by finding an unfair
trade practice, the court reversed an
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